The European integration process has long been characterised by the predominance of national executive powers. National parliaments were recognised as European actors after several decades only, in the Maastricht Treaty first and to an even larger extent in the Lisbon Treaty. Parliaments were hence long dependent on national constitutional, legal and administrative arrangements to be able to participate in EU affairs. This paper analyses how national parliaments (and their members) have reacted to the challenge the European integration process has represented for them while it also takes due account of the role other institutions, such as constitutional courts, have played in this field. It is argued that while these arrangements may have been successful in allowing national parliaments to play a greater role in this field, they should remain temporary for they are characterised by uncertainty and instability and make it generally difficult for citizens to follow up on national parliaments' actions and to be fully informed.
Introduction
As is well known, national parliaments were long absent from the European Communities (and then Union) Treaties. Indeed, they were mentioned for the first time in a (non-binding) Declaration annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht I (1992) and, although their status was improved in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) where they were the object of a legally-binding protocol, II it is only in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that they were (eventually) granted special importance in the European Treaties. Since then, they are actually one of the two pillars on which democracy within the EU is based (art. 10 Treaty of the European Union (TEU)) and are deemed to 'contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union' (art. 12 TEU). To this end, the Treaties themselves confer numerous rights of information and participation to national parliaments, most of which are contained in the same article 12 TEU.
On the other hand, this absence of any mention of national parliaments in the original European Communities (EC) Treaties can be explained by the general conception of them as 'classical' Treaties of international law which explains why it was logical that the Member States, i.e. their governments, alone were the addressees of it. Additionally, the European parliamentary assembly (later: European Parliament) was composed of representatives of national parliaments until 1979 when the first European direct elections took place so that de facto national parliaments were not totally absent of the European integration institutional game.
Moreover, this does not mean that national parliaments were not involved at all in EU affairs until then in their capacities as national institutions: their assent was most commonly required for Treaty ratification and national provisions could grant them rights of information and of influence. In fact, this participation in daily EU matters was possible on different grounds: because statutes recognising certain rights to parliament (or one chamber thereof) were approved or because parliamentary standing orders granted them certain capacities. The reason for approving these measures and their initiators differ(ed) too: they can (could) be the fruit of government's initiative, of parliamentary amendments introduced during the course of the approval of the ratification or implementation laws or an informal practice, among others.
Against this background, this paper seeks to analyse why and how national parliaments have empowered themselves through institutional engineering over time. To this end, institutional engineering is understood as the way in which parliaments have made use of the means they had at their disposal to improve their own position in EU matters until their importance in this framework was actually formally recognised at EU level and in their respective constitutions, in legal norms or in their parliamentary standing orders.
III
In order to study these different dynamics and their evolution, four Member States have been chosen on the basis of their different forms of adaptation to this need for 'selfempowerment': France, Germany, Italy and Spain. These case studies shall first serve to
show the factors that led to a need for 'self-empowerment' for national parliaments (2) and, second, to observe how these four national parliaments did empower themselves -or not (3).
Reasons for this need of self-empowerment of national parliaments
This second section shall analyse the reasons that led some national parliaments to be obliged to empower themselves whereas other national parliaments were not confronted to the same challenges. This is mainly linked to the absence of reform of the constitution and of the legal norms defining the role of parliament in EU affairs, and to the dispositions of the parliamentary standing orders themselves. National parliaments' need to make an extensive use of all the instruments they had at their disposal can be mainly traced back to institutional features of the Member States (2.1) and to the existence of judicial protection regarding parliamentary prerogatives in EU affairs or the absence thereof (2.2).
National parliaments constrained to use 'institutional engineering' because of Member States' institutional features
A first reason that explains why all national parliaments were not, originally, granted means of participation in EU affairs -and here reference is made to the Founding Statesis that the impact the European process would have, and the importance it would take, simply could not be grasped when the Founding Treaties were adopted. As already national parliaments so that national parliaments were indeed participatory to this process in a certain manner, although at the time the parliamentary assembly had almost exclusively advisory powers. This relates to the question of the actual interest of MPs for EU affairs:
This was especially the case in Italy and in Spain where, on the whole, EU matters were the domaine réservé of groups of 'happy few' interested by these questions, though in France and in Germany the situation was only slightly better. V Finally, another factor that influenced, and still influences, the role of a particular parliament in EU affairs is its position in the national institutional system. The French and Spanish parliaments for example are weak in any case, also in internal affairs. In France, this is mostly due to the role left to Parliament in the V th Republic: after the instability experienced during the IV th Republic (1946 Republic ( -1958 
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Yet, this need for national parliaments to empower themselves in EU affairs does not only derive from the institutional features mentioned; it can be also traced back to the absence of judicial protection of national parliaments' prerogative at national level. As regards Spain, the Constitutional Court has also been led to pronounce itself on the compatibility of EU Treaties with the Constitution but it is bond to answer to the question it is asked and cannot elaborate any further than that. The individual access to the Court for a breach of a fundamental right (recurso de amparo) has been very rarely used in this field contrary to Germany. It can thus be concluded that of the four Member States analysed here only in Germany Parliament has benefitted from the Constitutional Court's activism in its favour.
In the other three States, it is rather the absence of such protection that has contributed to national parliaments being forced to resort to 'institutional engineering' -and hence selfempowerment -to be able to participate in the EU integration process. As stated however, this situation may be linked to organic constraints in the courts' capacities and is not necessarily automatically attributable to courts' unwillingness to protect national parliaments or anything similar to this.
Having seen some of the factors that contributed to the existence of a need for these parliaments to empower themselves (or not, as in the case of Germany), in the third part we will observe how national parliaments have then actually proceeded to their 'selfempowerment'.
How national parliaments empowered themselves
As mentioned in the introduction, national parliaments did not remain indifferent to their status and have made use of a variety of means at their disposal to actually empower themselves so as to be able to participate in EU affairs even at times when this was not E -77 the Italian parliaments used their parliamentary autonomy (3.2). Besides, many of these arrangements simply took place on an informal basis (3.3).
Use of the capacities as legislator: the French example
As underlined above, whereas the German parliament saw its prerogatives reinforced as a consequence of the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and, hence, did not need to fight for its prerogatives -at least after the Maastricht decision -, the same does not hold true of the French parliament. As a matter of fact, the French parliament was particularly weak in EU affairs until 1992 XII when it made good use for itself of the fact that the Constitutional Court had declared that a constitutional revision was required before the It is thus considered that the Bundestag 'left itself time until the 1990s to react properly to the changes to the framework of its legislative prerogatives provoked by the European integration' (Mangold 2011: 69). However, even if it were never successful, the Bundestag did use the margin of action it had internally to try and enhance its capacity of scrutiny of EU affairs even in the absence of any reform of the constitutional and legal frameworks. E -80
Informal arrangements
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to these formal arrangements, the informal adaptation of national parliaments has played an instrumental role in allowing them to be involved in the European integration process, in particular during its first decades but this is, to a certain extent, still true up until today. In numerous cases indeed, informal arrangements are made that allow parliaments to perform a certain function without any formal modification of their prerogatives at any level. This may, for example, be due to the need to obtain a super majority to reform parliamentary standing orders as informal arrangements also allows for more flexibility. It is also a means to test new procedures before they are formally anchored in standing orders or other legal documents.
Interestingly, there is not always a will to formalise these procedures afterwards as they either are considered to function properly -this is the case in the Italian parliament with the subsidiarity check procedure since the Lisbon Treaty as detailed below -and/or because it is considered best to retain certain flexibility.
Such informal arrangements have for instance been used in order for parliaments to be able to control their governments: in Spain, until this practice was formalised in 1994, it was only according to a custom that a representative of the government came before the Congress of deputies to inform about the decisions taken during the previous meeting of the European Council, and that a debate was organised (Cienfuegos Mateo 1996: 90) . In 1994, however, this practice was formalised in the Law regulating the functioning of the Joint Committee on EU affairs (Law 8/1994) In Italy, none of the Chambers has reformed its standing order in the view of their participation in the Early Warning System for the control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity until today. Arguably, a legal basis for this control exists now in the law 234/2012 for the participation of Italy to the definition and the implementation of the norms and the policies of the European Union but these provisions have not been implemented accordingly in the Chambers' standing order. In the Chamber of deputies, the procedure is arguably defined in a quasi regulatory source as it is the Committee on the standing order that defined it in an opinion of 6 October 2009. This procedure was further refined and precised in a second opinion of the same Committee that had the task to review the first informal procedures and propose changes, which it did in an opinion of 14 July 2010. This assessment took place because, in this occasion as had already been the case in previous cases, it was decided that it would be best to try out the procedure on an informal basis before it is formalised (Esposito 2009 (Esposito : 1162 . But this second step was never taken. In the Senate, a similar situation exists as the basis for this Chamber's participation in the Early Warning System lies in two letters of its President -that are, additionally, not even publicly available.
Although these informal arrangements in place in these three national parliaments may be particularly effective, they present several risks. Indeed, they can be volatile, especially where there is no written agreement between parliament and government and, perhaps more importantly, there exists a real lack of transparency towards the citizenry which is particularly problematic as the European integration process is already recurrently accused of being undemocratic and as national parliaments are supposed to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the EU as established by article 10 TEU. Hence, even if these arrangements have been instrumental in the speedy adaptation of national parliaments to the novelties introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in particular, it remains that especially the informal arrangements raise the issue of the government's will: Without any formal protection of their prerogatives, parliaments remain at the mercy of their governments. This is not to say that this is not the case when formal arrangements exist -at least when the Treaty of Lisbon first entered into force, it was not uncommon for the Spanish government not to transmit the subsidiarity assessments requested by the Joint Committee on EU affairs and this possibility is anchored in Law 24/2009 for example. But there is no doubt that the parliamentary prerogatives are even less protected if no formal recognition exist.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown first that the need for parliaments to resort to institutional engineering often derives from particular features of each national institutional system. Besides, it appears that national constitutional courts also play or have played a decisive role in national parliaments' prerogatives being guaranteed or reinforced.
It results that, in several occasions, parliaments indeed had to fight for their prerogatives in EU affairs and, eventually, empower themselves the way they could.
Reasons for this may have been Member States institutional constraints and the absence of protection by a Constitutional Court as indicated. National parliaments' response to these shortcomings in turn implied using their influence in the legislative procedure, making use of their parliamentary autonomy and also introducing changes informally.
Although this aspect was not developed at length in the preceding analysis, one additional aspect relates to the fact that all national parliaments had to adapt to the same challenges simultaneously. When this need became most pressing with the introduction of the Political Union in the Treaty of Maastricht, national parliaments were also increasingly cooperating under the auspice of COSAC which most certainly allowed for the exchange of best practices and for cross fertilisation among national parliaments.
On the other hand, the fact that a parliament did not have to fight for its prerogativesas was largely the case of Germany after 1992 -it actually made use of the powers.
Actually, during a very long time, German MPs were very reluctant to do so and a lack of institutional adaptation in order to make the prerogatives attributed to parliament effective was long the rule.
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The personality of the actors involved appears to be an important factor in this framework, together with the salience of the issues. It is not random that the Bundestag has begun to resort more frequently to its powers since the beginning of the economic and All in all, parliamentary engineering in order to empower parliaments in EU affairs appears to have (had) a great potential for it has allowed for an important degree of flexibility and for the compensation of the shortcomings of the national constitutional and legal frameworks. In this sense, it should be praised and may still be considered a useful tool. Nevertheless, a risk of instability exists and is particularly present in this field as governments have generally been -and still are -particularly reluctant to involve national parliaments and give them a say as was illustrated during the peak of the Euro crisis when intergovernmental arena played the most important role and parliaments were only marginally involved. Therefore, parliamentary engineering should rather be a temporary solution useful to adapt swiftly and to test procedures before they are formalised.
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